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Abstract 
The use of corporate groups to conduct commercial activities is a common 
occurrence in large and small business undertakings. It is common for each 
entity to perfOlTIl a specialist function, including asset management and finance. 
Within corporate groups, a central parent or holding company often takes 
management responsibility for the strategic direction of the group, and will 
appoint directors and managers of its subsidiaries. The group subsidiaries will 
often depend upon the parent for -[mance and accounting services, human 
resources and procurement, with all key decisions made by the parent. The use 
of an enterprise group of entities to conduct a business leads to tensions with 
traditional corporate law notions of each company being a separate legal entity. 
The blurring of lines of independence can pose challenges for regulators 
assessing the status of transactions conducted within the group. The High Court 
of Australia will consider the use of corporate treasury companies in an 
upcoming appeal on the meaning of limited recourse debt for the purposes of 
income tax legislation.! This note will discuss the context of the decision and 
argue that the use of a member of a corporate group to provide in-house [mance 
should not, ordinarily, defeat the presumption of a company's independent and 
separate existence; nOf, based on the facts of the BHP Billiton case, should the 
use of intra-group transactions render otherwise commercial loans between 
corporate group members limited recourse. 
I Introduction 
Phillip Blumberg, the leading author on corporate groups, has observed that 
corporate groups of enormous size with complex multi-tiered corporate structures 
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dominate the national and world economy.2 Typically, the business is conducted by 
a group of affiliated companies under the control of a parent company that operates 
with a unity of purpose and a common design? As noted by the author, when legal 
issues involving any of the affiliated companies arise, the courts are often called 
upon to determine whether to attribute the rights, or to impose the duties of) one 
affiliated company on another affiliate of the group in order to achieve the 
objectives of the law in the area in dispute.4 Within this context, unsurprisingly, the 
issue of intra-group transactions arose recently in a dispute involving various 
companies in the BHP Billiton group and the Commissioner of Taxation. The 
dispute concerns the tax consequences resulting from the failure to repay intra-
group loans made by companies within the BHP Billiton group in respect of two 
failed projects that cost over $2 billion. On 3 September 2010, the High Court of 
Australia granted special leave to the Federal Commissioner of Taxation in respect 
of a decision of the Full Federal Court over the tax status of various deductions 
claimed by BHP Billiton.5 
Surprisingly, with reference to the undisputed facts of this case, the 
commissioner led arguments contrary to well established legal principles 
suggesting that one of the group companies was a 'mere conduit' of its parent 
company.6 As part of this argument, the commissioner attempted to apply div 243 
of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (designed to recapture 'excess' tax 
deductions for depreciating assets financed by limited recourse debt) in a manner 
characterised by the Full Federal Court as controversia1.7 The BHP Billiton dispute 
is significant as it is the first case to consider the scope of div 243.8 
This note will consider the context of the BHP BilUton decision and 
comment on the arguments raised by the commissioner in respect of the intra-group 
transactions which are, arguably, flawed for reasons advanced below with reference 
to corporate law principles and policy considerations underpinning the operation of 
div 243 of the tax law. It will be submitted that the High Court should refuse the 
commissioner's appeal from the decision of the Full Federal Court on the 
application of div 243 to the facts of this particular case. 
The discussion in the next part of this article on the use and regulation of 
corporate groups, is instructive for one of the legal issues which the commissioner 
raised in the BHP Billiton case concerning the separate existence of a corporate 
Phillip Blumberg, 'The Transformation of Modem Corporation Law: The Law of corporate groups' 
(2005) 37 Connecticut Law Review 605, 608. 
Ibid 606. 
Ibid. 
Transcript of Proceedings, Commissioner of Taxation II BHP Billiton Finance Ltd [20 10] RCA Trans 
229 (3 September 2010) (appeal against Commissioner of Taxation v BHP Billiton Finance Ltd (2010) 
182 FeR 526). 
Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22; Hobart Bridge Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (1951) 82 CLR 372; Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1; Industrial EqUity Ltd v 
Blackburn (1977) 137 CLR 567; Dennis Willcox Piy Ltd II Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
(1988) 79 ALR 267; Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 549. 
Commissioner of Taxation II BHP Billiton Finance Ltd (2010) 182 FCR 526, 279 [92]. 
The authors searched both the Australian Tax Reports, the Australian Tax Cases and LexisNexis 
Unreported Judgments for decisions discussing 'limited recourse debt' which resulted in only the 
BHP BiUiton cases. Search conducted 22 October 2010. 
2010] BEFORE THE HIGH COURT 725 
entity and the relationship between the parent and its subsidiaries. It pays to review 
the legal treatment of corporate groups before proceeding to discuss the case. 
II The use and regulation of corporate groups 
The relatively modern concept of utilising corporate group structures to operate 
businesses and assist with partitioning assets is widespread and entrenched in 
modem society. The utility of such arrangements depend on legal recognition and 
endorsement of the separate legal entity concept as applied to each member of the 
corporate group, including wholly- and partially-owned subsidiaries. The High 
Court of Australia has characterised corporate groups as involving 'a number of 
companies which are associated by common or interlocking shareholdings, allied to 
unified control or capacity to control,.9 
Research undertaken by Ramsay and Stapledon on the prevalence and use of 
group structures in Australia's Top 500 listed companies during 1997 showed that 
89 per cent of the listed companies surveyed controlled other entities. to This 
research demonstrates that larger and more valuable companies tended t~ have 
more controlled entities. tt This is unsurprising, given the numerous economic 
benefits that can flow from the use of integrated corporate groups to conduct 
business activities. The range of economic and commercial benefits available from 
operating corporate group structures include: 12 
• reducing commercial risk, or maximising potential fmancial return, by diversifying 
an enterprise's activities into various types of businesses, each operated by a 
separate group company; 
• taking advantage of commercial opportunities by fonning subsidiaries for use in 
joint venture projects, without involving the rest of the enterprise; 
• helping to reduce transaction costs by streamlining systems and building 
economies of scale; 
• taking advantage of tax benefits by operating local group companies in various 
countries with favourable tax treatment; 
• attracting capital without losing overall corporate control by creating a separate 
subsidiary to conduct the business and allowing minority shareholders to invest in it; 
• lowering the risk of legal liability by confining high liability risks, including 
environmental and consumer liability, to particular group companies, with a view 
to isolating the remaining group assets from this potential liability; and 
• providing better security for debt or project financing-for example, a separate 
group company may be formed to undertake a particular project and obtain 
additional finance by means of substantial charges over its own assets and 
undertaking. 
Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1,6 (Mason J). 
10 Jan Ramsay and Geof Stapledon, 'Corporate Groups in Australia' (2001) 29 Australian Business Law 
Review 7. 
lJ Ibid 27 (Table 5). 
12 See Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, 'Corporate Groups Final Report' (Report, May 
2000); Ramsay and Stapledon, above n 10, 13; Melvin Eisenberg, 'Corporate Groups' in Michael 
Gillooly (ed), The Law RElating to Corporate Groups (Federation Press, 1993) 1. 
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There are few legal restrictions on a company's ability to structure as a corporate 
group, with regulation of corporate groups generally based on the recognition of 
each group member remaining a separate legal entity. 13 The benefits of separate 
legal status also inc1ude limited liability for shareholders, even where the company 
is a wholly-owned subsidiary in a corporate groUp.14 Many commercial structures 
and arrangements are shaped by the legal fiction afforded by this basic legal 
doctrine. The concept of limited liability, as noted by one commentator,15 is 
entrenched in legal theory and is a fixed reality of the political economy. The use of 
corporate groups allows for a dual level of limited 1iability available to both parent 
and subsidiary companies, which while attractive for business investors wishing to 
shield themselves from individual liability through share ownership in the ultimate 
parent company, is not without its critics.16 A generally strict application of the 
separate entity approach in Australia by the High Court has facilitated the 
widespread use of group structures.I7 
One means of regulating abuse of individual entities operating within 
corporate groups is to look behind the separate corporate personality of those 
companies and hold the ultimate group controllers liable for the actions or debts of 
the group companies. IS At common law, there is 'no common, unifying principle, 
which underlies the occasional decision of courts to pierce the corporate veil'. 19 
This outcome is not surprising as veil lifting cases are inherently fact-specific and 
subject to individual interpretation, often resulting in the absence of clarity.20 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the courts have long recognised that the 
corporate form can be abused and the tendency of many business people to perform 
a kind of 'dance of the corporate veils' and to 'duck and dive behind the corporate 
veil' ?1 
13 See above n 6. 
14 Corporations Act 2001 (eth) s 516. 
15 For a review of the debate on the justification for limjted liability, see Robert Rhee, 'Bonding 
Limited Liability' (2010) 51 William and Mary Law Review 1417. 
16 The leading critic is Phillip Blumberg: see Phillip Blumberg, 'Limited Liability and Corporate 
Groups' (1986) 11 Journal of Corporation Law 573 and more generally Phillip Blumberg, The 
Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law (Oxford University Press, 1993). Blumberg's 
comprehensive critique of corporate group regulation is compiled and :maintained in the looseleaf 
service by Blumberg et al: Aspen Publishers, Blumberg on Corporate Groups (2nd ed). 
17 Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1; Industrial Equity Ltd v Blackbum (1977) 137 CLR 567. For 
a similar approach in the US, see BASF Corp v POSM II Properties Partnership LP (Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware, CA No 3608-VCS, 3 March 2009) reported in (2010) 35 
Delaware Journal o/Corporate Law 342. 
18 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588V which lifts the corporate veil by making the holding 
company liable for the debts of its subsidiary when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
the subsidiary was insolvent at the time of incurring the debt. See further, Ian Ramsay, 'Holding 
Company Liability for the Debts of an Insolvent Subsidiary: A law and economics perspective' 
(1994) 17 University of New South Wales Law ./ournai520. 
19 Jdoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2004] NSWSC 695 (13 August 2004) [144} 
(Einstein 1). 
20 Some US commentators have advocated the abolishment of veil piercing due to the dysfunctional 
nature of the doctrine. See,for example, Stephen Bainbridge, 'Abolishing Veil Piercing' (2001) 26 
Journal 0/ Corporation Law 479, 506-14. For a strong counter-view, see Robert Thompson, 
'Piercing the Veil: Is the common law the problem?' (2005) 37 Connecticut Law Review 619. 
21 Caesar's Empire Karaoke (a firm) v Lam Chuen Jp (Unreported, High Court of Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, Muttrie J, 24 March 2004, 4594/2003) [27]. For discussion on veil piercing, 
2010] BEFORE THE HIGH COURT 727 
One mechanism frequently argued as a basis for piercing the corporate veil 
within a corporate group is to allege that the parent and subsidiary company are 
involved in an agency relationship.22 At common law, the principal is liable for the 
contractual actions of its agent acting with the scope of its authority.23 Commonly it 
is argued that where a parent company totally controls its subsidiary, so that the 
subsidiary can be said to not have a separate existence, the parent company is the 
principal and should therefore be liable for the authorised conduct of its 
subsidiary.24 However, an assessment of modem Australian decisions on this point 
reveals that control--even overwhelming control-of a company is not sufficient 
to create an implied agency between the company and the controller.25 The judicial 
attitude to the treatment of companies within corporate groups is captured in the 
following remarks by Dodds-Streeton J in Varangian Pty Ltd v OFM Capital Ltd: 
The lIDderlying unity of economic purpose, common personnel, common 
membership and control have not been held to justify lifting me corporate veil. 
As recognised by Rogers J in Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd, even me 
complete domination or control exercised by a parent over me subsidiary is not a 
sufficient basis for lifting the corporate veil. This is an area in which 'the law 
pays scant regard to me commercial reality'. 26 
The above discussion demonstrates that Australian corporate law is reasonably settled 
on the point that parent and subsidiary company relationships commonly involve 
extensive (even oVe1Whelming) control being exercised by the paren~ however this is 
not sufficient to pierce the corporate veil to ignore the separate and distinct existence of 
the subsidiary entity. It is somewhat surprising then that the Commissioner of Taxation 
has been locked in a prolonged battle with mining giant BHP Billiton concerning the 
tax treatment given to financial arrangements between variQUS wholly-owned 
subsidiaries. The commissioner's argument, as we shall see below, is based on a 
complete disregard of the separate legal status of the subsidiaries. 
see Anil Hargovan, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil on Sham Transactions and Companies' (2006) 24 
Company and Securities Law Journal 436; Ani! Hargovan > 'Breach of Directors' Duties and the 
Piercing of the Corporate Veil' (2006) 34 Australian Business Law Review 304; Anil Hargovan and 
Jason Harris, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil in Canada: A comparative analysis' (2007) 28 The 
Company Lawyer (UK) 58. 
22 Ian Ramsay and David Noakes, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia' (2001) 19 Company and 
Securities Law Journal 250. 
23 Francis Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (Sweet and Maxwell, 17th ed, 2001) art 73. 
U See the frequently cited, although rarely applied, decision of Atkinson J in Smith Stone & Knight 
Ltd v Birmingham Corp (1939] 4 All ER 116. For a critique see Jason Harris, 'Lifting the Corporate 
Veil on the Basis of an Implied Agency' (2005) 23 Company and Securities Law Jownal7. 
ACN 007 528 207 Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bird Cameron (2005) 91 SASR 570; McConnell Dowell 
Constructors (AlLSt) Pty Ltd v Gas Transmission Services WA (Operations) Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 
301; Premier Building and Consulting Pty Ltd v Spotless Group Ltd (2007) 64 ACSR 114. See 
further Anil Hargovan and Jason Harris, 'The Relevance of Control in Establishing an Implied 
Agency Relationship Between a Company and its Owners' (2005) 23 Company and Securities Law 
Journal 459. 
26 [2003] VSC 444 (12 November 2003) 28-9 [142]. See similar comments in Ace Property Holdings 
Ply Ltd v Australian Postal Corp [2010] QCA 55 (19 March 2010) 24-5 [88] and in Adams v Cape 
Industries pIc [1990] Ch 433, 536. 
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III The BHP Billiton litigation 
A The facts of the dispute 
The facts of the dispute include tax deductions associated with the costs of two 
major industrial developments that involve several billion dollars. A large number 
of companies were involved and the nature of the transactions was complex. The 
following is a concise explanation of the main facts. 
BlIP Billiton Ltd is one of the largest mining and resources companies in the 
world with a market capitalisation value in excess of US$165 billion,27 and has 
operations that span the globe.28 To speak of the company as a single entity (ERP 
Billiton) is in fact a misstatement as the 'company' is made up of dozens of 
subsidiary companies and other controlled entities that operate in six continents?9 
The scale of operations undertaken by the corporate group required a continuous 
stream of significant debt finance. BlIP Billiton was of the view that it would be a 
complicated and inefficient process for each of the controlled entities in the group to 
arrange their own finance, which led the group to establish a finance subsidiary in 
1975 to act as a treasurer for the entire group (BlIP Billiton Finance Ltd-'Finance 
Ltd'). 
Finance Ltd borrowed funds for operational purposes from a range of 
external creditors (who were not members of the BlIP Billiton group) using a mix 
of short-, medium- and long-term funding arrangements. The sources of finance 
included single and syndicated bank: loans, commercial paper and medium-term 
notes with creditors based largely in the United States, Europe and Japan. Finance 
Ltd was a wholly-owned subsidiary within the BHP Bmiton group and had no 
individual employees. Its workforce was provided by other entities in the BHP 
Billiton group which were paid from Finance Ltd's funds for the supply of labour 
and other fmancial and accounting services. As a wholly-owned subsidiary it is 
unremarkable to note that the Board of Finance Ltd was made up of appointees 
from the parent company. All funds borrowed by Finance Ltd were guaranteed by 
the parent company BHP Billiton. 
During the relevant period in the late 1990s, Finance Ltd provided all of the 
debt finance for the members of the BHP Billiton group which amounted to tens of 
billions of dollars. Finance Ltd lent money to the members of the group on standard 
tenns and conditions that were the same for all transactions. Finance Ltd's lending 
and borrowing activities each year were determined by treasury guidelines set by 
BHP Billiton finance and accounting staff and approved by senior fmance, tax and 
accounting executives in the group and ultimately by the parent company's board. 
Decisions about the capital funding structure of particular projects were made by 
27 BHP Billiton is a dua11isted company as a result of the merger between BHP and Billiton in 2001. 
Its securities are listed on various securities exchanges around the world (with primary listings on 
the ASX and London Stock Exchan.ge). 
28 BHP Billiton, Annual Report 20 J 0, 
29 Ibid notes to the financial statements 25, 26. 
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the parent company and then implemented by Finance Ltd to the extent the projects 
required debt funding. 
Borrowers within the BHP Billiton group were required to maintain loan 
accounts with Finance Ltd's external bank facilities that involved a daily cash 
sweep. At the end of each day the accounts were cleared out and recorded as either 
being in debit or credit. Finance Ltd earned significant interest income (in excess of 
$1 billion) each year from the repayment of the various loans it made to group 
members, which it paid tax on. 
The dispute at the centre of the case concerned the tax deductibility of two 
failed projects undertaken by the BHP Billiton corporate group during the J 9905. 
B The first project 
The first project involved BHP Direct Reduced Iron Pty Ltd ('DRI') which was 
established to build and manage an industrial plant that would produce a saleable 
product made from the waste generated from the group's substantial iron ore mining 
activities. At the time oftbe project's commencement in 1995, it was considered that 
the waste produced from the iron ore activities was a drag on the profitability of the 
group~ not only because of the nil value of the waste but also because of the cost of 
storing the waste. The project was forecast to realise significant internal rates of 
return (in excess of 17 per cent) although this would require the expenditure of 
several billion dollars in construction and maintenance costs. Approval was granted 
to undertake the project and funding was provided by a mix of debt from Finance Ltd 
and equity from other companies in the BlIP Billiton group. The group's Treasmy 
Guidelines stated that projects should not be funded from 100 per cent debt unless 
necessary. 
The DRI project experienced significant technical problems that resulted in 
diminished capacity and quality of output. More frequent maintenance was required 
than was originally anticipated and this contributed to delays and increased the 
costs of the project. The global market for its product also dropped in value. These 
developments led to significant writedowns in the value of the project by more than 
$1 billion. Finance Ltd provided a letter of comfort to the directors of DRI stating 
that it did not intend to seek repayment within 12 months of its loans to DRI. The 
amount owed by DRI to Finance Ltd at this time was more than $2 billion. 
A strategic review undertaken by Ernst & Young in 2000 indicated that the 
value of the DRI project was only $346 million, and would be nil if the project was 
shut down. The board of directors of Finance Ltd resolved to record the majority of 
the loans owed by DRI as bad debts (amounting to over $1.8 bi11ion) with a 
provision set aside for the remaining $346 million. The directors of Finance Ltd 
also resolved at this time that 'it would not be economically prudent to expend 
additional monies in taking proceedings to recover any or all of the [loan funds] 
once they have been written off. Finance Ltd also gave written assurance to the 
directors of DR! that it would not seek to recover its debts for the next 12 months, 
although it reserved the right to do so. 
However, within the next 6 months further capital expenditure was made 
which seemed to resolve the technical issues and BHP subsequently took action 
under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) div 245 to cancel a substantial 
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portion of the losses that Finance Ltd had previously claimed as bad debt 
deductions. 
C The second project 
The second project concerned a mineral sands operation in Western Australia (W A) 
known as BHP Titanium Minerals Pty Ltd ('TM'). TM was a wholly-owned 
subsidiary in the BHP Billiton group. The group's plan was to develop the mining 
facility in conjunction with the acquisition of a mineral processing facility in 
Norway, with the product of the project being shipped from WA to Norway_ The 
facility, which cost over $300 million to construct and maintain, was funded by 
Finance Ltd after approval from the BHP Billion board. The project, however} was 
plagued by technical problems from the start that resulted in several large 
writedowns. After an attempt to sell the business failed, the directors decided to 
close it down and Finance Ltd wrote off its debt. 
The parent company provided several letters of com fort to the TM directors 
to assist with their assessment of the company's solvency. The comfort letters 
stated that Finance Ltd did not intend to call on the repayment of the loan for the 
duration of the letter (usually 12 months). The comfort letters were then replaced 
by a formal deed of support which covered the 1M directors from future liabilities 
relating to their obligations to the W A Government under the terms of the mining 
agreement. Once this support deed was executed, the comfort letter was revoked 
and Finance Ltd called in the repayment of the debt. When the debt could not be 
repaid (which Finance Ltd knew at the time of calling for the repayment of the 
debt) it took the remaining balance held in its account for TM in partial repayment 
(approximately $11 million) and wrote off the remaining loan as a bad debt. 
IV BHP Billiton's tax claims 
As noted above, Finance Ltd wrote off large portions of its debts owed by DR! and 
TM as being bad. It claimed these as deductions under the lncome Tax Assessment 
Act ]997 (Cth) s 25.35, which requires that the debt be lent during the course of a 
business lending money. Importantly, for the purpose of the appeal to the High 
Court, the tax treatment of the debt-funded development costs were not subjected to 
the limited recourse loan provisions in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 ceth) 
div 243.30 These provisions require tax deductions for capital allowances to be 
reduced where some or all of the loan funds that allowed the acquisition of the asset 
(whose value was then written-down) was limited recourse debt.3l Limited recourse 
30 A substantial portion of the debts were however subject to consolidation after BHP Bimton became 
a consolidated tax group following the introduction of group consolidation rules after the relevant 
events occurred. For a discussion of the tax consolidation regime see Kristen Grover, <Impact of the 
Consolidation Regime on Project Finance in Australia' (2004) 23 Australian Resources and Energy 
Law Journal 246. 
31 A capital anowance deduction involves recognition for the depreciating value of a capital asset, in 
this case the value of the plant and equipment funded by the loans from Finance Ltd. Capital 
allowance deductions are permitted under a number of divisions of the 1997 Act: see for example, 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) divs40 and 43. 
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debt is determined by consideration of whether the creditor's enforcement rights 
are limited in some way, including a limitation of recourse only to the property 
acquired by the loan funds.32 An alternative mechanism for establishing the 
existence of limited recourse debt is to examine the relationship between the debtor 
and creditor and make an assessment whether it is: 
(2) ... reasonable to conclude that the rights of the creditor as against the 
debtor in the event of default in payment of the debt or of interest are capable 
of being limited ... hav[ing] regard to: 
the assets of the debtor ... ; 
any arrangement to which the debtor is a party; 
whether all of the assets of the debtor would be available for the purpose of 
the discharge ofthe debt ... ; 
whether the debtor and creditor are dealing at ann's length in relation to the 
debt)) 
The limited recourse debt provisions were introduced as part of the tax law 
reforms in 1997 and have no previous place in Australia's tax laws.34 They serve 
the purpose of ensuring that capital aIJowances do not over-compensate for losses 
recorded by the borrower when they were never fully at risk of having to repay the 
debt in full. The BI-W Billiton dispute is significant as it is the first case to consider 
the scope of div 243. 
The Commissioner of Taxation issued a notice disallowing the deductions 
on the basis that Finance Ltd was not operating a business of lending money but 
rather as a mere conduit for BHP Billiton's investment activities. Furthermore, the 
commissioner chal1enged the quantum of deductions claimed WIder both the 
general anti-avoidance rules and div 243. The assessment was challenged by 
Finance Ltd in the Federal Court. 
A Case history 
The following matters fell for determination before the Federal Court: 
1. whether Finance Ltd was entitled to a deduction in respect of each amount written-
off as bad; 
2. in relation to the TM loan. whether the loan was in fact bad and whether the 
commissioner made a valid determination under general anti-avoidance rules in 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) pt IVA to cancel that bad debt deduction; 
and 
32 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 243.20(1). 
33 Ibid s 243.20(2). 
34 Thomsonreuters, Australian Income Tax 1997 Commentary (Thomson Tax and Accounting Online 
database and Loose-leaf service), [243.1 010], (viewed 20 October 2010). 
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3. in relation to the DRl project, whether div 243 applied to disallow capital 
allowance deductions claimed by BHP Billiton as head enti1y of a tax consolidated 
group in respect of the decline in va1ue ofDRl's assets. 
B Was Finance Ltd in the business of 
lending money? 
The main issue for determination here was whether Finance Ltd was in the business 
of lending money and) if so, whether each loan was made by the company. in the 
ordinary course of business. The main submissions of the commissioner centred on a 
theme which disputed that Finance Ltd was a separate legal entity and alleged that it 
was acting at the behest of the corporate group. 
The primary judge concluded that the fact that the directors of the corporate 
boards overlapped and that Finance Ltd relied upon the staff and processes of the 
corporate group (for which it paid a fee), did not detract from the inevitable fmding 
that Finance Ltd was not a sham, nor a mere conduit.35 Justice Gordon held that the 
commissioner's submissions to the contrary were not only against the facts, but 
also, contrary to long established legal authority.36 The fact that Finance Ltd might 
have been, or in fact was, acting in the corporate group's interests was held not to 
be unusuaL37 
The Full Court, in a unanimous judgment,38 emphatically dismissed the 
appeal by holding that the facts did not support the commissioner's argument that 
Finance Ltd was in a business that was merely an appendage to the business of the 
corporate group as a whole.39 Justice Edmonds, on behalf of the Full Court 
(Sundberg and Stone JJ agreeing), held that this was not a case where Finance Ltd's 
activities of borrowing and lending money were ancillary, subservient or 
subordinate to some other business carried on by Finance Ltd. On the contrary, his 
Honour held that the evidence established that: 
Finance's activities involved the borrowing of money and the lending of that 
money to companies in the Group; that these activities were carried on over a 
substantial nwnber of years on a regular and systematic basis; that the amounts 
... involved very substantial sums of money; that the amounts lent were 
invariably lent at a rate of interest higher than the rate at which it borrowed 
those funds; that in consequence, over a period from 1986 to 2002 it derived 
interest income in excess of $34 billion, accounting profits after tax in excess 
35 BHP Billiton Finance Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 72 ATR 746 (Gordon J). 
36 See authorities cited in n 6 above. 
37 For a similar conclusion, see NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 277 
which was relied on. 
38 Commissioner of Taxation v BHP Billi/on Finance Ltd (2010) 182 FCR 526. 
39 The court relied on the following precedents for the trite proposition that, where a subsidiary, even 
if wholly owned by a parent company, carries on a business, the business is that of the subsidiary 
not the parent irrespective of how closely it may monitor the business activities of the subsidiary: 
Commissioner of Taxation 'V Bivona Pty Ltd (1980) 21 FeR 562; Commissioner of Taxation v 
Tasman Group Services Pty Ltd (2009) 180 FeR 128. 
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of $2.8 billion and aggregate taxable incomes in excess of $4.4 billion; more 
telling, in only two of those 17 years did it suffer a taxable loss ... 40 
733 
The commissioner's submissions, under such circumstances, were held to be 
'perverse' .41 In light of the undisputed evidence which showed that Finance Ltd 
was a separate legal entity which exercised an independent corporate mind, the Full 
Federal Court affirmed that the write-off of the BDI debt and the TM debt as bad 
were losses inclUTed by Finance Ltd and, indeed, were allowable deductions under 
s 8.1(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth).42 
C Was Part IVA applicable to the deduction 
for the write-off of the TM debt as bad? 
Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) relates to schemes designed 
to obtain a tax benefit.43 The Full Federal Court, in agreement with the primary 
judge, held that the existence of comfort letters did not prec]ude Finance Ltd from 
writing the debt off as bad on the basis that all the evidence pointed to the TM debt 
being 'conjecturaJJy bad,44 before the revocation of the comfort letter. In 'light of 
this conclusion, it followed that Finance Ltd could not have obtained a tax benefit 
in connection with the scheme (that is, the replacement of the comfort letter with a 
narrower deed of support and the subsequent removal of the comfort letter) 
identified and relied upon by the commissioner. Justice Edmonds noted in passing, 
with reference to the commissioner's concession on this issue, that the writing-off 
of the TM debt by Finance Ltd was the most obvious and simple commercial 
solution and that this course of action was not surprising having regard to the facts 
of the case. 
1 Division 243 
The Full Federal Court affirmed the primary judge's conclusion that the loans from 
Finance Ltd to DRI were not 'limited recourse debt' for purposes of div 243, 
described earlier. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the commissioner 
contended that in determining whether the rights of the creditor (Finance Ltd) 
against the debtor (DRl), in the event of default by the debtor, are limited wholIy or 
predominantly to rights in relation to the debt property-the word 'rights' in s 
243 .20( 1 )( a) should be given a wide meaning extending beyond contractua1 rights 
to also include legal rights. Furthermore, the commissioner submitted that the word 
'limited' did not ask whether the rights on a relevant event of default were 
contractually confined in some way, but rather how far, in practice, were tho~e 
40 Commissioner of Taxation v BHP Billiton Finance Ltd (2010) 182 FCR 526, 537 [23]. 
4J Ibid 537-8 [24]. The court relied upon the test in Fairway Estates Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation (1970) 123 CLR 153 to determine whether the lending by Finance Ltd was made in the 
ordinary course of its business of lending money. 
42 For a similar result in a case also involving loans made to other subsidiaries of the Foster's group 
involving written-{)ff bad debts, see Ashwick (Qld) No 127 Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation 
[2009} FCA 1388. 
43 For definition of 'tax benefit" see s 177C(1) of the income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth); for 
definition of 'scheme', see s 177 A(2) of the Act. A similar attempt by the commissioner to usc pt 
IVA to disallow deductions claimed by corporate group members of the Foster's group was 
unsuccesgful in Ashwick (Qld) No 127 Ply Ltd v Commissioner oj Taxation [2009] FCA 1388. 
44 Commissioner oj Taxation v BHP Billiton Finance Ltd (2010) 182 FeR 526,551 [68]. 
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legal rights projected to extend. According to the commissioner, this approach 
looked to the financial position of the borrower at the time the advance was made 
rather than any contractual confinement of the lender's recourse to detennine 
whether the lender's rights on a relevant event of default were 'limited' in the sense 
used in the'section. 
After reviewing the legislative policy underlying div 243, namely to reverse 
capital allowance deductions that have been obtained for expenditure funded by 
debt when the debtor is not fully at risk in relation to the expenditure and the debt is 
not fully repaid, Edmonds J (Sundberg and Stone JJ agreeing) rejected the 
commissioner's contentions for the following reasons: 
the proper construction of ss 243.20(1) and (2) ... are to be construed so that 
their application is confined to situations where, at the time of borrowing, the 
debtor is not fully at risk in relation to the expenditure because of contractual 
limitations on the lender's rights of recourse on a relevant event of default Of, 
where, at the time of borrowing, the debtor or someone else has the capacity 
to subsequently bring about that state of affairs.45 
The Full Court agreed with the primary judge's approach that it is to be 
inferred that where, as here, all of the assets of the debtor (DR!) are available for 
the purpose of the discharge of the debt, that would be a factor supporting the 
conclusion that the rights of the creditor (Finance Ltd) against the debtor (DR!) in 
the event of default are not capable of being limited in the manner specified.46 A 
contrary finding could result in all loans to start up businesses being classified as 
limited recourse. 
V Issues before the High Court 
The commissioner sought special leave from the Full Federal Court~s decision in 
respect of both projects. In relation to the TM project, the commissioner sought to 
challenge the lower court's refusal to apply the powers in pt IVA of the Income Tax: 
Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). The High Court refused special leave on this matter, 
which left only the DRI project losses. 
The court granted special leave to appeal the lower court's refusal to 
characterise the DR! loans as limited recourse or non-recourse under div 243 of the 
Income Tax: Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). The central point in this argument is 
whether the capital allowance deductions (in writing-off most of the value of the 
DRI project) obtained by BHP Billiton should have been reduced because in 
making the loans Finance Ltd was never fully at risk. 
The commissioner's argument for special leave concerns the proper 
interpretation ofs 243.20 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). Subsection 
(1) of that provision provides a definition of limited recourse debt by reference to 
limitations in the creditor's legal rights in enforcing the repayment of the loan. 
45 Ibid 581 [104]. 
46 Ibid 581-2 [106]. 
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Subsection (2) of that provision goes on to say that debt is also limited recourse if it 
is reasonable to conclude that it is having regard to a range of factors. The main 
point of difference between the parties in the High Court appeal is to determine 
how these two provisions work together. The relevant portions of the section are as 
follows: 
243.20 What is limited recourse debt? 
(1) A limited recourse debt is an obligation imposed by law on an entity (the 
debtor) to pay an amount to another entity (the creditor) where the rights of 
the creditor as against the debtor in the event of default in payment of the 
debt or of interest are limited wholly or predominantly to any or all of the 
following: 
(a) rights (including the right to money payable) in relation to any or all 
of the following: 
(i) the debt property or the use of the debt property; 
(ii) goods produced, supplied, carried, transmitted or delivered, or 
services provided., by means of the debt property; 
(iii) the loss or disposal ofthe whole or a part ofthe debt property or 
of the debtor's interest in the debt property; 
(b) rights in respect of a mortgage or other security over the debt 
property or other property; 
(c) rights that arise out of any arrangement relating to the fmancial 
obligations of an end-user of the financed property towards the 
debtor, and are financial obligations in relation to the financed 
property. 
(2) An obligation imposed by law on an entity (the debtor) to pay an amount 
to another entity (the creditor) is also a limited recourse debt if it is 
reasonable to conclude that the rights of the creditor as against the debtor in 
the event of default in payment of the debt or of interest are capable of being 
limited in the way mentioned in subsection (1). In reaching this conclusion, 
have regard to: 
(a) the assets of the debtor (other than assets that are indemnities or 
guarantees provided in relation to the debt); 
(b) any arrangement to which the debtor is a party; 
( c) whether all of the assets of the debtor would be available for me 
purpose of the discharge of the debt (other than assets that are 
security for other debts of the debtor or any other entity); 
(d) whether the debtor and creditor are dealing at armIs length in relation 
to the debt. 
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As can be seen, the definition of limited recourse debt contains two parts 
and here lies the difficulty with the construction issue. One way to interpret the 
provisions is to treat them separately so that sub-s (1) deals with legal limitations to 
recovery, while sub-s (2) deals with practical limitations to recovery. Another way 
to construe sub-s (2) is to hold that it builds on the scope of sub-s (1) so that a 
practical ability to limit the creditor's rights to recover (in a way mentioned in sub-
s (1)) would constitute limited recourse debt. 
The commissioner argued during the specia1 leave hearing that the lower 
courts failed properly to address the scope of sub-s (2). However, with respect, it is 
difficult to see how loans from Finance Ltd for the DR! project could be 
characterised as limited recourse. The mere fact that the loans were made in an 
intra-group financing arrangement does not necessitate the result that the loans are 
practically or legally limited. Counsel for the commissioner noted in the special 
leave hearing that the debtor and creditor were not necessarily dealing with each 
other on an arm's length basis (which is a relevant consideration under 
s 243.20(2)(d)). However, the teIDls of the intra-group loans were stricter than the 
teIDls under which Finance Ltd dealt with its external lenders. Simply put, Finance 
Ltd expected to (and in fact did) earn profits from the loans it made. Loans were 
made under commercial teIDls with group borrowers, not as part of a scheme to 
generate tax deductions but to make the funding arrangements as simple as possible 
for external lenders. Finance Ltd expected to be paid and demanded commercial 
decisions to be taken by its debtors in response to deteriorating economic 
fundamentals associated with the project. 
FurtheIDlore, the mere fact that the loans involved intra-group transactions 
does not mean that recourse was necessarily limited to the assets acquired through 
use of the loan funds in building the project (see s 243.20(2)(a)). The 
commissioner's assumption is that Finance Ltd would not seek to pursue another 
group company beyond the value of its capital assets. Finance Ltd made a 
commercial decision that to pursue DR! for the remaining balance would not be 
beneficial. It should be noted that Finance Ltd had already undertaken an extensive 
review of the project with external advisors. 
It is difficult to argue that the intention of the parties at the time of making 
the loan was that Finance Ltd's rights would be limited to the capital developed in 
the project. The argument of economic equivalence was, in our view, rightly 
rejected by the lower courts. The operation of div 243, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, does not extend to situations where companies borrow money to 
establish their business. In such situations, the creditor's rights of recovery are 
limited to the assets acquired with the loan funds because those are the only assets 
held by the company. In the case of the loans to DRI, Finance Ltd seized funds held 
with it on deposit and made provision for the estimated value of the capital assets 
while writing off the remaining loan funds as bad. To apply div 243 to such 
circumstances would be to render most start-up loans as limited recourse-a 
conclusion that defies common sense and would surely trigger the application of s 
243.20(6): 
2010] BEFORE TIlE HIGH COURT 
(6) Also, an obligation that is covered by subsection (1), (2) or (3) is not a 
limited recourse debt if, having regard to all relevant circumstances, it would 
be unreasonable for the obligation to be treated as limited recourse debt. 
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Indeed, as observed by the Full Court, the construction contended by the 
commissioner would place business in this country, particularJy for those involved 
in resources and infrastructure projects, in a 'tortuous straight jacket' .47 
The ATO has clearly) and repeatedly, signalled its concern in public on the 
tax treatment of claims arising from intra-group money lending transactions.48 
Readily it is accepted that some in-house finance companies may seek to abuse tax 
provisions, seek to gain excessive tax deductions in an illegitimate manner and that 
the commissioner has a legitimate purpose to test the law and seek clarification on 
its operation in an appropriate case. It is unclear however, from the facts of the 
present case, what is the mischief that is being sought to be addressed by the 
commissioner in the context of commercial financial arrangements undertaken in 
legitimate intra-group transactions by sophisticated parties, with the lender 
(Finance Ltd) registered as a financial institution and money market operator. It is 
submitted that acceptance of the commissioner's submission on the construction of 
div 243, with reference to the facts of the present case, will arguably result in a 
strained interpretation of div 243 and signifY an attempt to drive a square peg into a 
round hole. 
VI Conclusion 
The use of corporate groups is an entrenched feature of the modem commercial 
world. The principle most famously recognised by the House of Lords in Salomon 
v A Salomon & Co Ltd-that a company is a separate legal entity regardless of the 
identity of its true owners--continues to have force more than 110 years later. It is 
worth repeating the basal proposition advanced by Tamberlin J in Richard Walter 
Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner o/Taxation: 
I think it is artificial in the circumstances of the present case [corporate group 
context] to draw a distinction between the loans made to members of the 
group and loans to other persons or bodies.49 
It is easy to understand why wholly-owned corporate groups operating 
under a similar brand name such as BHP Billiton can result in misconceptions 
being made that the entities in the group are mere conduits or agents for the group 
and not independent in their own right. While a wholly-owned subsidiary usually 
takes its management and strategic direction from its parent or holding company, 
that in no way diminishes the separate and independent status that each company 
has. This simple proposition has profound legal consequences that pervade every 
aspect of the law. 
47 Ibid 582 [107]. 
4S See the recent speech given by the Assistant Commissioner (Jim KiHaly), 'Assisting Compliance 
and Managing Tax Risks in the Large Market: Understanding ATO approaches and perspectives' 
(Speech delivered at the Fifth Annual Corporate Tax Forum, Sydney, 18 May 2009). 
49 (1995) 95 A TC 4440, 4458. 
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The pending decision of the High Court of Australia in the BHP Billiton 
case involves financial transactions within corporate groups that are increasingly 
common and in widespread use in Australia for both small and large organisations. 
It is to be hoped that the Court will apply the rules in div 243 in a manner that 
reflects· the explicit statutory direction in s 243.20(2) and (6}-that the 
characterisation of a loan arrangement as limited recourse debt must be reasonable 
in the circumstances. 
